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A Tightrope over an 
Abyss: 
Humanity and the 
Lords of  Life
TIMOTHY FRANCIS URBAN
The similarities between Ralph Waldo Emerson and Friedrich Nietzsche are striking in that both emphasize philosophy 
as an active process that is the never ending and creative task of  
the individual subject. As such, they viewed the world as being 
written through an individual’s subjectivity. Their affirmation of  
the individual as a creator of  self  and world establishes them within 
the same philosophical scope. Both thinkers were ahead of  their 
time in their ability to recognize and deconstruct past philosophical 
assumptions in order to move forward and create a philosophy for 
the future. 
 To create their own philosophies for the future, Emerson 
and Nietzsche needed to look to the past to destroy previous 
assumptions so they could erect their own individual modes of  
thought. To do this, they needed to deconstruct old philosophies 
through language. This undertaking required recognition on their 
parts that language is never fixed, never static, and always open to 
interpretation. In short, language is not simply reduced to binary 
opposites, for in between these binaries, there are degrees of  
definition. These degrees of  difference depend on the individual’s 
perspective. Through individual interpretations, language is always 
ambiguous and can be molded in a way to mirror the perspective 
of  the individual who is engaged in a reciprocal relationship with 
language. The individual creates the very language that defines him 
or her, making identity a creation of  language. 
 Emerson and Nietzsche conceived of  the inherent gap 
between language and the world of  objects, but instead of  this 
recognition leading to a pessimistic and nihilistic worldview, one void 
of  meaning, both thinkers placed the individual in the center, making 
him/her the creator of  meaning. Emerson acknowledges the world 
as we know it is a creation. He writes, “Nature and literature are 
subjective phenomena; every evil and every good thing is a shadow 
which we cast” (209). Since Nature and literature are only possible 
through language, they are by default subjective phenomena. Nature 
and literature are subjective phenomena because both require a 
subject to do the naming, and hence “every evil and every good 
thing is a shadow which we cast” is meant to convey how we use 
language, which can only ever be metaphorical in describing objects 
of  the world, to create a human interpretation of  Nature. Our ability 
to name and create implies we can never know the Truth, which is 
absolute, but only truths, which are subjective, and how we can never 
know the thing-in-itself, but only the world of  our own subjectivity.
 For both thinkers, the aforementioned gap between language 
and the thing-in-itself  allows for ambiguity, which necessitates 
interpretation for any meaning to be had. Ambiguity leads to 
reinterpretations that inevitably refer to a process always in the act of  
creating. By singling out the word “process,” it becomes important to 
note that by this both thinkers recognize the hermeneutical process 
as never ending. It is my contention that both philosophers reconcile 
the gap between language and the thing-in-itself  through their 
representations of  the subject engaged in the hermeneutical process. 
 This paper looks at how both thinkers look to the individual 
as the bridge between language and the thing-in-itself  (the latter is a 
Kantian term used to designate the noumena, which is the “mind-
independent-world, and can be defined as an object’s essence). I look 
at how Emerson conceives of  the poet as sayer and a creator of  
meaning. In relation to this, Emerson’s essay, “Experience,” develops 
the notion of  the poet as creator by examining how reality is created 
by individuals. Emerson, in the face of  having his own world 
shattered after his son Waldo’s death, is forced to build his world back 
up, creating a new foundation by engaging with his hermeneutical 
consciousness. Emerson is only able to establish meaning through 
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interpretation. The hermeneutical process is ever-transforming 
and dependent upon the existence of  a subject who engages and 
practices it (Makarushka 85). To highlight how the hermeneutical 
process works through language, I will depend on Nietzsche’s essay 
“On Truth and Lies in the Nonmoral Sense,” which as an early 
Nietzschean text is highly indebted to Emerson.
 For the hermeneutical consciousness to take hold of  an 
individual, there needs to be the recognition that all we encounter 
is interpreted through our own unique subjective lens. And the only 
way interpretation is ever possible is through language, something 
we take as a given, and thus for granted, yet without it, no meaning 
is possible. As the eminent Emerson critic of  today, Stanley Cavell 
has written quite a bit about Emerson’s use and views of  language. 
Cavell asserts that Emerson’s use of  language in “Experience” is a 
way for Emerson to re-inhabit the ordinary (Unapproachable 82). 
To re-inhabit the ordinary requires Emerson to reject the Kantian 
noumenal realm, or the thing-in-itself, which is always unknowable 
and outside of  language and subjective experience, so he can undergo 
the necessity of  “synthesis” (Unapproachable 86). By synthesis, 
Cavell claims Emerson puts his experiences together into a unified 
whole through his encounter with a world of  objects. In other words, 
Emerson embraces the phenomenal world created by language so he 
can re-inhabit the ordinary world of  objects. 
  On one level I agree with Cavell, since Emerson seeks out 
and advocates that the subject embrace a middle way in “Experience.” 
Nonetheless to say all Emerson does here in the essay is accept how 
language defines the ordinary is to miss the point. For Emerson, 
language both writes us while we write it, thus giving us presence 
within the world. The structure of  language is circular, and within 
the pre-existing structure there is room for the subject to create 
new meaning. I take Cavell’s assertion that Emerson re-inhabits the 
ordinary as limiting, whereas Emerson’s actual engagement with the 
hermeneutical process is liberating. 
 Concerning the limits of  language in “Experience,” critic 
Gayle Smith correctly recognizes how Emerson is preoccupied by 
the inherent gap between language and its relation to the world, 
writing, “The problem of  reconciling language and reality seems 
particularly urgent in “Experience,” where Emerson decries the way 
subtle forces, including language itself, predetermine our perceptions, 
robbing us of  genuine contact with reality” (85). Language does rob 
us of  contact with genuine reality, if  by genuine reality Smith means 
it prevents us from knowing a thing’s essence. The Emerson of  the 
first half  of  “Experience” would agree with her. Smith’s argument 
fails to touch upon how Emerson is optimistic about language and 
the subjective use of  it by the end of  the piece. 
 The Emerson of  the second half  of  “Experience” does not 
despair of  the depravity of  language. He sees an opportunity. It is 
this very depravity that allows the subject to take a stance, as a bridge, 
connecting in his/her own way the gap between language and reality. 
With this recognition we encounter the Emerson who utters, “why 
not realize your world?” (212). However, the creation of  a new world 
is only possible for Emerson once the old world has been destroyed. 
This is why we need to encounter the disillusioned Emerson of  the 
first part of  “Experience,” otherwise the affirmative Emerson of  the 
latter half  would not be able to reconstruct his world. There would 
be nothing to reconstruct if  the old edifice still stands in the way.
 The old edifice is Kant’s transcendentalism, which 
distinguishes between two worlds: the a priori world of  phenomenal 
existence, or the world we see empirically every day, and the noumenal 
realm, or the world of  essences or ideas. In short, Emerson ignores 
Kant’s noumenal realm to focus on the only realm he can ever know 
in his own way: the phenomenal realm.
 Nietzsche, in his essay, “On Truth,” takes Emerson’s stance 
and interrogates the gap between language and the world-in-itself. He 
recognizes this gap but takes Emerson’s argument a step further by 
calling the Truth of  this gap an illusion (whereas Emerson just states 
it is unknowable). Nietzsche recognizes that language is a metaphor 
for the world, and as such, the concept of  a tree is an illusion that has 
little or nothing whatsoever to do with the object-in-itself. Nietzsche 
writes, 
 We separate things according to gender, designating the tree as 
masculine and the plant as feminine. What arbitrary assignment! How 
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far this oversteps the canons of  certainty! We talk of  a “snake”: this 
designation touches only upon its ability to twist itself  and could therefore 
also fit a worm. What arbitrary differentiations! (116)
 The arbitrariness of  language leads Nietzsche to assert the 
thing-in-itself  is always incomprehensible, so why ever strive for it. 
No one who is a user of  language can ever achieve or grasp hold of  
the thing-in-itself. Stanley Cavell, acknowledging this in This New Yet 
Unapproachable America, writes about philosophers who try to clutch 
versus philosophers who are merely attracted to things (86). The 
former tries to synthesize language and reality but fails in reconciling 
the two. The latter recognizes, like Nietzsche, the impossible task 
of  reconciliation and instead, due to his/her attraction to objects, 
undergoes the process of  creating his/her own world.  
 Many critics have previously cited the relationship between 
the two thinkers, with most noting a similarity between concepts, 
ideas, and philosophy as a way of  life, thus in opposition to 
metaphysical musings and the past as guide. In her extensive study 
entitled Religious Imagination and Language in Emerson and Nietzsche, 
Irena S.M. Makarushka argues the religious imagination and language 
of  the two thinkers “are both the condition and the expression of  
individual freedom” (104). She does this by focusing on how each 
thinker uses language to construct, and, therefore, create his own 
image of  the world, connecting this task to religion in the sense that 
the religious is meant to establish the meaning of  the self  and the 
world. 
 Makarushka identifies each thinker’s task as being a direct 
response to the nihilism of  the prominent organized religions of  
their day, defining doctrine as being fixed and thus impenetrable. It is 
this stasis of  religious meaning, she argues, that compels each thinker 
to turn to the original point of  religion, which is “religion as an active 
process engaged in reinterpreting the world” (4). Therefore, though 
Nietzsche is arguably an atheist, and Emerson denies the Christian 
version of  God, both thinkers use language to destroy past dogmas 
and beliefs to reinterpret the world through their own subjectivity. 
 Critics have been drawn to both thinkers because they share 
such an affinity for the way they view the subject encountering the 
world. In “Experience,” Emerson begins with the question “Where 
do we find ourselves?” and he responds with a declaration meant to 
show him tottering between knowing and ignorance. His answer: “In 
a series, of  which we do not know the extremes, and believe it has 
none” (198). 
 Sharon Cameron, in her essay “Representing Grief ” has 
aptly argued that this sense of  being lost in the world, uncertain of  
one’s ability to know, is the direct result of  the death of  Emerson’s 
child. She takes this further and argues that for the remainder of  the 
essay, the dead child is present even where he is absent, and thus 
she makes the entire essay center on the death of  Waldo. Although 
the death of  the child is the catalyst that begins the essay, it is not 
what holds it together. What holds the essay together is Emerson’s 
own subjective self  because, as Ryan White notes, the essay shows 
Emerson’s transition “from a representational mode of  philosophy 
to a semiotic one” (288). In “Experience,” Emerson is no longer 
concerned with showing how language represents or mirrors what he 
calls the Lords of  Life – Illusion, Temperament, Succession, Surface, 
Surprise, Reality, Subjectiveness – but rather he has shifted to examine 
how human subjects use language. With the human subject as center, 
Emerson later asserts we are all we can know, writing, “Hermes, 
Cadmus, Columbus, Newton, Bonaparte are the mind’s ministers” 
(211) to emphasize how reality has been created by human minds. 
 Emerson reveals how language is always in the process, and 
never finished, of  unveiling reality to the subjective self. As Nietzsche 
asserts in his essay “On Truth,” the world of  reality is a human world 
resulting from the human intellect. Through language it is the only 
world we can know. 
 Cavell uses the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
specifically his Philosophical Investigations, to describe what Emerson is 
trying to accomplish in “Experience.” Cavell writes, 
 In the Investigations…the demand for unity in our judgments, that is, 
our deployment of  concepts, is not the expression of  the conditionedness 
or limitations on our humanness but of  the human effort to escape our 
humanness…Wittgenstein has discovered the systematic in the absence of  
unity. (87-88)
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 In other words, unity, as a concept, is impossible, since 
experience as a continual process prevents completeness, and thus 
unity, from every truly occurring. To overcome this, Wittgenstein 
establishes that philosophical systems are a means of  compensating 
for this absence of  unity in an undefined world. By defining the 
world, categorizing it, humanity creates order from chaos. Subjectivity 
allows us to create through language, erecting ourselves as divine 
beings, part and particle of  the whole, which escapes language 
and thus definition. We deploy concepts to escape our humanness, 
for these are the inventions that separate us from the other beings 
inhabiting the earth.  Our ability to create systems is our only means 
of  affirming our own certainties in the face of  an always uncertain 
world. As Emerson writes, 
 We have learned that we do not see directly, but mediately, and that 
we have no means of  correcting these colored and distorting lenses which 
we are, or of  computing the amount of  their errors. Perhaps these subject-
lenses have a creative power; perhaps there are no objects. (209)
 For Emerson, the only certainty we can have is a faith in 
our own existence, an existence that allows us to will our worlds 
into creation, hence the subject-lenses and their creative power. We 
mediate between the self  and world and interpret it to synthesize the 
“Not-I” with the “I” who experiences the world as objects. When 
Emerson writes about perhaps there being no objects, he is saying 
that indeed our subjective views may be wrong, but nonetheless they 
are all we have to work with. He writes, “We animate what we can, 
and we see only what we animate. Nature and books belong to the 
eyes that see them. It depends on the mood of  the man, whether 
he shall see the sunset or the fine poem” (200). We encounter, we 
interpret, and our views encounter the interpretations of  others, so 
that we sometimes reinterpret, all of  which leads us to the creative 
will, which is further developed by Nietzsche after Emerson.
 Like Emerson in “Experience,” Nietzsche is forced to 
explore pessimism before he can begin the act of  creation leading 
to affirmation. This pessimism is the result of  skepticism, which 
puts into question objective truth. If  there is no objective truth, 
then there can be no ultimate meaning and life is thus meaningless. 
Objective truth is outside of  the subject, and, therefore, this view 
of  meaningfulness assumes that meaning must be given through 
some external force or higher power, such as God or any other 
deity. Without a deity, the idea that life has inherent value beyond 
the subject dissolves.  Since meaning does not exist outside of  the 
subject in an objective sense, it is up to the subject to assert his/her 
own power to create meaning through language. Power, for Emerson 
and Nietzsche, comes from the subject’s ability to create meaning 
from nothing, or to create it from pre-existing modes of  thought. 
 The lack of  objective meaning must be reconciled through 
the subject’s interpretation of  his/her own existence. We must create 
our own purpose.  Thinking through a lack of  objective meaning to 
subjective meaning requires, as Cavell argues in his essay “The Future 
of  Possibility,” thinking through pessimism to affirmation (22). In 
short, since there is no outside meaning, there can only be meaning 
coming from within, which is just as valid as meaning coming from 
without. This is empowering. It means we, as individuals, are in 
essence like gods – we erect systems and imprint our will on the 
world in a perpetual and eternal process of  meaning-making.
I. Where Do We Find Ourselves? The Gap Between Experience 
and Reality
 At the beginning of  “Experience,” the reader encounters an 
Emerson at once unfamiliar and absorbed by melancholy. As I have 
noted already, he begins his essay with a definitive question: “Where 
do we find ourselves?” (198). He answers with us finding ourselves 
surrounded by uncertainty. This is essentially a pessimistic Emerson, 
one whose worldview has been shattered by the death of  his son. 
He responds: “We wake and find ourselves on a stair: there are stairs 
below us, which we seem to have ascended; there are stairs above us, 
many a one, which go upward and out of  sight” (198).
 This evokes the Derridean “aporia,” which is “not so much 
the space outside a particular perspective (how would one know it 
is there?) but is instead the inside mark of  the boundary of  that 
perspective’s limit—an indication of  an outside space” (White 292). 
By evoking the aporia, White establishes that there is knowledge 
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beyond our own, but I think he misses the point of  Emerson’s 
beginning the essay with uncertainty. 
 By beginning with uncertainty, Emerson is foreshadowing 
the only certainty he can be sure of: his own subjective experience 
of  the world. Even if  he doesn’t exist in the sense put forth by 
Descartes’ cogito (i.e., a rational thinking self), he can still be certain 
of  his experience of  subjectivity, because even if  the self  does not 
exist in reality, it exists through Emerson’s own unique experience 
of  it. This is undoubtedly the project of  his self-reliance. Emerson’s 
staircase metaphor is evocative of  the aporia, perhaps, but he more 
consciously aligns the staircase with his own philosophy’s recognition 
of  the transience of  human experience. One moment we are on one 
step, the next we have moved upward and onto another step, and 
thus the process continues as such. In “Alone in America,” Cary 
Wolfe writes,
 The project of  Emersonian self-reliance . . . is thus driven by, and 
follows through on, the challenge of  skepticism: just as the inability 
to apprehend the world is the very rationale of  philosophy, so the very 
transience of  the self, the provisionality of  any proof  of  selfhood, is the 
rationale for its “onwardness,” its continued “enacting” of  its existence. 
(141)
 In short, self-reliance entails the recognition of  an aporia, 
and then an acceptance of  its existence, so that one can move on and 
continue living. It’s no wonder Emerson, near the end of  the essay 
proclaims, “Never mind the ridicule, never mind the defeat: up again, 
old heart!” (213). Our perspectives may very well be an illusion, as 
skepticism stresses, but what does that matter? We still have to live 
out the illusion.
 Emerson recognizes his world view has been shattered, 
yet the world remains sturdy in the face of  his wavering subjectivity. 
The Emerson of  “Experience” is not the same Emerson of  
“Compensation,” the one who has faith in the universe’s ability to 
balance everything with a purpose. This is a much darker Emerson, 
one who has experienced the death of  a son, and one who has 
learned nothing from it. 
 In the beginning of  “Experience” we don’t, as Cameron 
and White so adamantly believe, encounter an Emerson who is 
trying to avoid the subject of  his son’s death, rather we encounter 
an Emerson who is devastated by his son’s death. Here Emerson’s 
grief  is the catalyst that starts the essay in the sense that it starts with 
a shattered worldview where all is threatened to be meaningless so 
he can resurrect himself  and build his worldview back up through 
the hermeneutical process of  the subject reconstructing his world. 
In other words, “Experience” begins with our inability to know, 
firmly accepts our inability to know, and replaces it with our innate 
ability to interpret and thus create. In essence, he recognizes what 
Nietzsche does in the beginning of  “On Truth,” which is the world 
as perceived by humans is always in the process of  being interpreted 
and recreated. 
II. Language and the Hermeneutical Process
 For Nietzsche, interpretation is a part of  the will to create, 
and “language is an expression of  individual freedom experienced 
as the revaluation of  all values” (Makarushka 49). As it is with 
Emerson, so it is with Nietzsche: “language is not an event but an 
eternally unfolding interpretative process engaged in the creation 
and reconfiguration of  meaning informed by the metaphoricity of  
language and its ‘as if ’” (Makarushka 49). The revaluation of  all values 
was the ultimate goal of  Nietzsche’s whole philosophy. In essence, 
the task was to take old definitions and moral concepts and to reveal 
them to be nothing more than constructs created by men from past 
ages. As such, these created concepts were not fixed and were open 
to analysis and interpretation. The old was open to reinterpretation. 
Emerson and Nietzsche realized meaning is not a given: it is created.
 In typical Emersonian and Nietzschean fashion, this 
process of  meaning-making is not as simple as seeing an event and 
interpreting it in a specific way. Meaning-making must be grounded, 
and to be so one must be familiar with the modes of  prior thought 
throughout history. Emerson, in texts such as “The American 
Scholar” and “The Divinity School Address,” pushes aside the past 
to create something new, but Nietzsche goes a step further in being 
more forward and harsh in his dealings with prior thought. 
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 Nietzsche’s revaluation of  all values is possible because of  
his ability to destroy, or rather deconstruct, the ideas and so-called 
facts of  the past through language. As Cavell writes, “If  we are to 
think anew it must be from a new stance, one essentially unfamiliar 
to us…or from a further perspective that is uncontrollable by us” 
(“Possibility” 22). To think anew is to encounter the unknown, which 
is to meet uncertainty, and thus entails being able to sense possibility. 
By thinking from a new stance, we engage in creation, and thus the 
idea of  possibility itself  becomes possible through the very act of  
creating something new. As Emerson and Nietzsche would have it, 
this is what is meant by thinking for the future (“Possibility” 23).
 In “Experience,” Emerson nods to past thinkers who loved 
the real, but we get the sense Emerson disdains this notion of  the 
real. The real leads to stasis, not creation. As he puts it, 
Our love of  the real draws us to permanence, but health of  body consists 
in circulation, and sanity of  mind in variety or facility of  association. We 
need change of  objects. Dedication to one thought is quickly odious. We 
house with the insane, and must humor them; then conversation dies out. 
(202)
 Permanence is, by definition, immovable and fixed, which 
goes against our human experience of  the world. Our perspectives are 
always moving, transforming, and being created. It’s no accident that 
Emerson mentions the body in this section. For we are bodies, and 
as bodies we bridge the gap in a concrete way between language and 
world as appearance. The relationship we have as bodies encountering 
the world is circular, like the blood flowing through our veins, and we 
find sanity in the recognition of  life as perpetual process. As he puts 
it, “We need change of  objects.” Without change, life becomes static 
and in a sense unbearable, since stasis is not conducive to the creative 
power that moves all of  human life to discovery and self-realization.
 Language for Emerson, in the first half  of  “Experience,” 
is, as I have said, viewed with despair. Emerson “condenses his 
long-standing suspicion about the inadequacy of  language faithfully 
to convey thoughts and impressions” (Smith 85). This is why 
he describes existence as a state of  sleep or drunkenness in the 
beginning. However, the subject must regain composure, and the 
only way to do this is through language. Language in short, though 
inadequate, is all we have, and since this is the case we need to use it 
to assert our own autonomy. As Makarushka writes,
 In the transparency of  language and the symbolic character of  action 
Emerson saw the possibility of  the creation of  meaning. His deeply felt 
concern about meaning, values, and the future is animated by a belief  in 
the possibility that language can heal the fissures wrought by the losses he 
experiences. (53) 
 In light of  language’s therapeutic value, “Experience” 
can then be read as doing what it set out to do, which was to heal 
Emerson from the loss he suffered when Waldo died. The essay 
is divided into two parts: (1) despair and (2) hope. In the first part 
language is viewed skeptically, but in the second part it is viewed 
optimistically. This is because the latter half  of  the essay has accepted 
the “metaphoricity” of  language, lining it up with the metaphorical 
identity between nature and mind, which “suggests through their 
collaboration language becomes the condition for meaning” (70). 
Mind is determined by language, and, therefore, the type of  language 
one thinks and uses becomes paramount to how one engages with 
the world. Emerson says as much when he writes, 
 I distrust the facts and the inferences. Temperament is the veto or 
limitation-power in the constitution, very justly applied to restrain an 
opposite excess in the constitution, but absurdly offered as a bar to original 
equity. When virtue is in presence, all subordinate powers sleep. On its 
own level, or in view of  nature, temperament is final. (202)
 For Emerson, one’s temperament is defined by the language 
one uses, and when positive and affirmative language is used then 
a positive temperament will follow. Without language, the concept 
of  virtue would be impossible, but with it, Emerson is able to give 
the concept a presence. By giving virtue a high value, Emerson is 
able to assert how it is above all of  the other powers within the 
individual. His assertion is that outside facts and inferences are not 
grounded anywhere, and, therefore, the only place they exist is within 
the individual, whose temperament defines the value of  those very 
facts and inferences. The individual thus validates what is important 
through his/her temperament. Through temperament and validation 
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subjective truth is created.
 Nietzsche’s view of  language mirrors Emerson’s in that he 
acknowledges the metaphorical nature of  language and ascertains that 
knowledge of  the Truth and the thing-in-itself  is impossible. There 
is no point in even trying to comprehend it. It is beyond language, 
and thus there is never any gap between language and the world-in-
itself  since the latter exists beyond all knowledge and understanding. 
Therefore, like Emerson we must work with the only vehicle we do 
have: language.
 What then is truth? A moveable host of  metaphors, metonymies, 
and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of  human relations which have 
been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, 
and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and 
binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they 
are metaphors that have become worn out and have been now considered as 
metal and no longer as coins. (117)
 Nietzsche’s view that Truth is an illusion, a truth that 
humanity has forgotten is an illusion, seems to mean that since we 
can know nothing, then what’s the point? Why try to understand 
the mind-independent-world if  it is unknowable, always eluding 
our grasp? These questions miss the mark. For, by acknowledging 
the world as we know it to be a product of  humanity and its many 
languages, we are able to see that the world only takes on meaning 
when we are a part of  it. Without us, without our languages, it would 
mean nothing, and therefore, it could not be claimed to have any value 
whatsoever. We make things important, we inscribe them with value, 
and by recognizing we have created meaning we can recognize that 
we are empowered to speak in our own language, not the language of  
our peers or the language of  our past. 
III. Affirmation and the Knowledge of  Self-Creation
 To speak our own language, we must know the languages 
that are different than our own, but we do not need to speak or create 
in these pre-established modes. As Emerson writes, “People forget 
that it is the eye which makes the horizon, and the rounding mind’s 
eye which makes this or that man a type or representative of  humanity 
with the name of  hero or saint” (209). With this proclamation, it 
becomes clear that without man nothing would really matter, for 
whom would it matter? 
 Humanity is the catalyst that puts the creative will into 
motion and paints the world in its own image. Is this solipsistic? Most 
certainly, but that is not necessarily negative. The reason for this is it 
can never be truly solipsistic since by creating the world and giving 
meaning we are not only saying we are the center of  the universe and 
thus the only part that matters. No, by painting the universe with our 
languages we make the objects we create meaningful, thus defining 
ourselves and objects through the relational metaphors of  language. 
Emerson puts it better,
 Thus inevitably does the universe wear our color, and every object falls 
successively into the subject itself. The subject exists, the subject enlarges; all 
things sooner or later fall into place. As I am, so I see; use what language 
we will, we can never know anything but what we are. (210-211)
 Emerson and Nietzsche were two thinkers, and poets in 
their own right, who took to task the radical destruction of  the 
philosophical tradition they took up by refusing metaphysics and 
affirming a philosophy of  the future, which is to say a philosophy 
that reconciled thinking with experience through practice, pitting the 
subject in the middle into the task of  thinking as a means of  self-
creation. As Nietzsche writes, “I speak only of  what I have lived 
through, not merely of  what I have thought through: the opposition 
of  thinking and life is lacking in my case. My ‘theory’ grows from my 
‘practice’” (qtd. in Lambert 233). This mirrors the task of  Emerson’s 
“Experience.” He is forced to live his way through his philosophy 
by encountering and experiencing the loss of  his son and placing 
himself  as the subject at the center in order to work through the 
act of  self-transformation. This is the act of  turning subjectivity 
into practical power. It is taking one’s own theory of  experience and 
putting into to practice, thus allowing action to perpetually occur 
as the individual moves ever forward. In short, what Emerson and 
Nietzsche reveal is this: we are the lords of  life.
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